The Relationship Between Target and Its Financial Advisor in Mergers and Acquisitions -- Are There Still Benefits to Gain? by Gjörup, Alexander & Sarmes, Aleksandra
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Relationship Between Target and Its 
Financial Advisor in Mergers and Acquisitions 
- Are There Still Benefits to Gain? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
School of Economics and Management  
Department of Economics 
 
NEKH01 
Corporate Finance, Economics 
Degree Project, Bachelor of Science in Business and Economics 
Autumn semester of 2013  
Authors Supervisors 
Aleksandra Sarmes Dag Rydorff 
Alexander Gjörup Ola Bengtsson 
 
 
1 
 
Title The Relationship Between Target and Its Financial Advisor in Mergers and 
Acquisitions – Are There Still Benefits to Gain? 
 
Seminar date  01/31/2014 
 
Course Bachelor Thesis in Economics, 15 University Credit Points (ECTS) 
 
Authors Aleksandra Sarmes and Alexander Gjörup 
 
Supervisors Dag Rydorff and Ola Bengtsson 
 
Key words Relationship banking, Investment Banking, Asymmetrical Information, 
Target, Mergers & Acquisitions, Financial Advisor 
 
Purpose We aim to measure the effect of relationship building between target-firm 
and financial advisor in the Mergers and Acquisitions industry. We also aim 
to investigate what affects the target-firm’s decision to stay loyal or switch 
financial advisor.  
 
Methodology We use a quantitative approach to analyze our cross-sectional data sampled 
from a database. We run both least square regressions and a probit regression 
to analyze our data. Further, we use an inductive research approach.  
 
Theoretical perspective Asymmetrical Information, Relationship Banking 
 
Empirical Foundation Our data consist of 686 observations collected from the database S&P Capital 
IQ. The data involves Mergers and Acquisitions transactions in Europe and 
the United States from 01/31/2010 to 12/31/2012. 
 
Conclusions Our main findings show that relationship building does not have a significant 
effect on the advisor fee and speed of transaction. Instead of earlier 
cooperation as representing relationships, transaction-oriented variables such 
as size of transaction and amount sought in the target-firm, have a larger 
influence on advisor fee and speed. Even though benefits as lower advisor fee 
and a quicker closed deal, will not be gained by building a relationship, 
target-firms still tend to stay loyal to their financial advisors when 
transactions are large (>$1 000 000 000), when they are cooperating with one 
of the top banks or when they already have had an earlier cooperation with 
that particular advisor. 
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1. Introduction 
Relationships in the banking industry have varied over time in importance and magnitude and have developed 
differently over the diverse areas of banking. As the finance industry has changed due to external forces such as 
technology changes, government interventions and globalization thus have the relationships between clients and 
banks changed.
1
 
 
The importance of different relationships is a widely studied area and has again become highly relevant due to 
the development of the industry. It has recently been shown that Investment Banking relationships in general 
have during the last fifty years decreased in priority, as a consequence of primarily developments in information 
technology and financial engineering that in turn have transformed the financial markets.
2
  
 
A specific branch of Investment Banking that we find specifically interesting in terms of relationships is Mergers 
and Acquisitions, throughout this paper we are writing M&A when referring to Mergers and Acquisitions. An 
M&A transaction can have a variety of different features and be executed in different ways, but the foundation of 
this kind of transaction is when a target-firm is acquired by another firm (acquirer). The M&A process may look 
different depending on the type of M&A transaction that is performed, although there are some common steps 
that are often reoccurring in M&A transactions. Both acquirer and target normally need to hire advisors, most 
importantly financial advisors, to go through with the procedure. Targets and acquirers often hire their financial 
advisors, through a process where the advisors pitch (present) why they are most suited to help the firms in the 
transaction. Research shows that one variable that can have impact on this decision is the potential financial 
advisor’s experience and acquaintance with the other part involved in the process.3 
 
Earlier research is mostly exploring relationships in Investment Banking regarding acquirers. There is also a 
great amount of research that has focused on the relationship between client and financial advisor in the lending 
branch of banking. As far as we know, there is little research regarding the relationship between target and 
advisor in M&A. We find this relationship particularly interesting to investigate due to the lack of research, the 
difference in M&A relationships compared to lending relationships, and industrial development. The advisor and 
                                                          
1
 Morrison A., Wilhelm W. (2013) 
2
 Morrison A., Wilhelm W. (2013) 
3
 Ianotta G. (2010: 121) 
5 
 
target-firm relationship is often more dynamic than the relationship between a lending institution and its client. 
The main reason for this difference is that lending relationships can be more standardized when the relationship 
increases, while M&A transactions are often very different from deal to deal, even with an information 
advantage gained from prior cooperation.
4
 Does this complexity in the M&A process increase the importance of 
relationships and trust in your financial advisor?  
 
The purpose with our paper is therefore to investigate the relationship between target-firm and financial advisor 
in M&A transactions. How important is relationship building in this industry today, from the target’s viewpoint? 
Can target-firms benefit from being loyal to their financial advisor by rehiring the same advisor for further M&A 
transactions? Additionally, for what type of M&A transactions will this be benefitting and how much will it 
benefit targets? The main questions we aim to answer are: 
 
I. Are target-firms benefiting in terms of lower advisor fees or faster closed deal, from having a 
relationship with a financial advisor? Also, what type of deals will benefit firms most and to what 
extent? 
II. What decides if a target-firm chooses to build a relationship with a financial advisor? 
 
Our main findings show that relationship building does not have a significant effect on the advisor fee and speed 
of transactions. Instead of earlier cooperation, transaction-oriented variables such as, size of transaction and 
amount sought in the target-firm, have a larger influence on advisor fee and speed. Even though benefits as 
lower advisor fee and a quicker closed deal will not be gained by building a relationship, target-firms still tend to 
stay loyal to their financial advisor when transactions are large (>$1 000 000 000), when they are cooperating 
with one of the top banks or when they already have had an earlier cooperation with that particular advisor. 
 
We choose to distinguish our paper from the conventional structure and have a more narrative method for 
presenting our research. The traditional academic structure have a tendency of dividing the paper into several, 
smaller parts which we find could distract the reader and limit the fluency for a shorter paper as ours. Instead we 
choose to merge some parts and focus on the fluency, reader friendliness and keeping the reader’s interest 
                                                          
4
 Corwin SA, Stegemoller M. (2013) 
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throughout the paper. To strengthen these aims with our structure, we also mention our main questions in several 
sections, for the reader to easier keep the purpose of our paper in mind while reading the different parts.  
 
Section two brings up our theoretical framework where we aim to give a deeper insight of the relationship 
between target and advisor as well as of traditional Investment Banking. Further in this section we discuss theory 
that should support or challenge our hypotheses. Lastly we present our hypotheses development and our main 
questions that we aim to answer. In section three we firstly present our research approach, secondly we describe 
our data sample and our variables. In this section we also bring up our estimation techniques to give the reader a 
deeper insight of the process of our research. Lastly, we discuss strengths and weaknesses of our study. Section 
four consists of our research results, where we reveal the results individually for each of our questions. Our 
discussion of the main results is presented in section five, where we also discuss each question separately. 
Finally, in section six we bring up our main conclusions from the discussion. In section seven we give our 
proposals for further research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Target-Advisor Relationship and Traditional Investment Banking Overview 
M&A advisors are often hired by both the buying and selling firm to help them navigate through the process. For 
this service, they charge an advisor fee
5
. The variety of different M&A fees can vary from simple fixed fee 
contracts to more intricate and tailored agreements
6
. As stated before, we focus on the relationship between the 
financial advisor and the target firm. It is well-known that a financial advisor to the target-firm has a higher 
potential compensation than being advisor to the acquiring company. This is because the usual transaction 
agreement often includes a success fee in the completion of the deal.
7
 
 
Despite the variety, the fees can commonly be separated into two simple types, fixed fee contracts and fees that 
are contingent on the success or completion of the deal. The most common contract includes both a fixed fee and 
a contingent fee. Recent developments have led to a more mixed use of contingent fees. One reason for this is 
that the target-firm can create incentives for the advisory to act in a common interest as the payment depends on 
the outcome.
8
  
 
The speed of the transaction is another factor that is important for the target-firm. Several studies have been 
made regarding the question of speed and its benefits and impacts on M&A transactions. Generally, these studies 
show that there is a positive relationship between the speed of the transaction and the final outcome of the M&A 
deal. This is because a quick execution will minimize the uncertainty amongst the participants. Because of this, a 
relatively fast M&A deal is something firms often value. Worth noticing is that under certain circumstances, as 
when dealing with a cross-border M&A where large cultural differences can emerge, a slower attitude might be 
more favorable than a faster one.
9
  
 
There is also a variety of different characteristics of an M&A deal that can affect both the advisor fee and the 
speed of the transaction. One feature is the size of the transaction’s value; this value can differ substantially 
between different transactions. Statistics show that in 2012 the global break-down of different deal sizes where 
                                                          
5
 Forte G., Ianotta G., Navone M. (2008) 
6
 Hunter W., Walker M. (1990) 
7
 Forte G., Ianotta G., Navone M. (2008) 
8
 Hunter W., Walker M. (1990) 
9
 Homburg C., Bucerius M. (2006) 
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23,2% ($0-500 million), 28,3% ($501-2 000 million), 30,6% ($2 001-10 000 million) and 17,9% (10 001 million 
and over).
10
 The advisor fees often increase with the size of the transaction, but not in direct ratio to the size. 
This is because the amount of work that goes into selling a large business is not often far from the cost of selling 
a smaller business.
11
  
 
Another feature is the number of advisors involved in the M&A process which increases the complexity of the 
transaction and is something that varies from deal to deal
12
. An additional feature is if the deal attitude is hostile 
or friendly. A hostile deal attitude is when the management of the target-firm is unwilling to agree on an M&A 
deal. Further, a hostile takeover can cause severe asymmetrical information. This increases the complexity and 
effort that the financial advisor has to put into the deal as they are not able to access the same amount of 
information as in a friendly negotiation.
13
  
 
Another feature of the deal is the percentage sought in the target-firm. Also this could be a feature that is 
different from deal to deal. Does the acquiring firm seek to seize 100% of the target firm’s stock and does this 
affect the price that the target has to pay to its financial advisor and will it affect the speed of the transaction?
14
 
The industry of the target-firm is also a feature that might have an impact on the transaction, one industry that is 
particularly difficult to value is the finance industry. This is due to the amount of information asymmetries that 
can be associated with the profits of banks etcetera.
15
  
 
Further, the relationship between firms and financial advisors has changed in the last half decade, targets and 
acquirers are now more willing to pick banks on a deal-to-deal basis rather than building a long-term 
relationship. By doing so they can seek the lowest issuance fee, best deal appointment or any other condition 
they desire. Earlier, firms could lower the asymmetrical information problem with long-term relationships but 
the recent development with contingent fees, diminishes the significance of these relationships.
16
  Another reason 
for the decrease in importance of relationship banking is the technology development, which enables financial 
                                                          
10
 The Statistics Portal 
11
 Walter TS, Yawson A., Yeung CPW (2008) 
12
 Kale JR., Kini O., Ryan HE. (2003) 
13
 Chahine S., Ismail A. (2009) 
14
 Ianotta G. (2010: 123) 
15
 Xiang P., Zhou J., Zhou X., Ye K. (2012) 
16
 Morrison A., Wilhelm W. (2013) 
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advisors to monitor and advise firms at longer distances than before. With new technology, firms can also choose 
from a larger variety of financial advisors as they are no longer limited by the geographical proximity.
17
  
 
Another factor that affects the firm’s loyalty in terms of firms keeping a relationship with their advisor, is the 
reputation of the financial advisor. Highly reputed advisors have a higher probability to be selected again for 
further transactions.
18
 In 2007, firms spent $4,2 trillion on M&A activity worldwide. Investment Banks acted as 
financial advisors in 85% of these deals by transactions value
19
. The Investment Banks are dominated by a group 
of  “bulge bracket” banks. The bulge bracket is made up by the largest and most profitable Investment Banks. 
 These top-tier banks are less likely to create value-destroying deals for the target and are instead more likely to 
create value-enhancing deals. Also, top-tier banks have a higher probability of completing a deal compared to 
lower-tier banks.
20
   
 
Target-firms do not rehire financial advisors in the same extent as before, and the process of employing a new or 
rehiring a financial advisor is now a critical decision for many firms. Research shows that regarding this 
decision, target-firms should use the same valuations as in any other financial decision, meaning that they should 
choose the best choice for increasing the wealth of the company.
21
  
 
 
2.2 Theoretical Support and Challenges 
2.2.1 Asymmetrical Information 
The theory of asymmetrical information was first presented by George A. Akerlof’s paper The market 
for”lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the market Mechanism. In this paper Akerlof describes asymmetrical 
information problem in the case of the automobile market. His main argument is that in many markets the buyer 
has limited information about the good, while the seller has more intimate knowledge about the particular item. 
He further argues that this information asymmetry gives incentives to the seller to conceal certain elements of the 
specific item in order to get a higher price.
22
 In the case of M&A, we can see the target-firm as the seller and the 
                                                          
17
 DeYoung R., McMillen DP., Klier T. (2003)  
18
 Dempere JM (2011) 
19
 Golubov A., Petmezas D., Travlos NG (2012)  
20
 Rau P. (2000) 
21
 Bower HM, Miller RE (1990) 
22
 Akerlof GA (1970) 
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financial advisor as the buyer. All markets are exposed to asymmetrical information
23
, because of this, 
information gathering and information exchange take a very important part of the financial advising in order to 
determine the price of a certain company
24
. 
 
A problem that might arise in the M&A process is if the target-firm obscures certain elements which make the 
due-diligence process harder for the financial advisor. This might later lead to the cancellation of the M&A deal 
and the financial advisor will only receive a retainer fee for the service. The target-firm can also be exposed to 
asymmetrical information since the financial advisor might not act in the interest of the target-firm. It’s hard for 
the target to measure the effort of the financial advisor and pay them an advisor fee that is in relation to that 
effort. One way to decrease the asymmetrical information problem is through relationship building.
25
 Evidently, 
having done a transaction with a client before reduces the effort to collect information and it will also make the 
information more secure. Research shows that through building a relationship and hence decreasing the amount 
of asymmetrical information and effort in collecting the information, the price paid by the client to its advisor for 
the service can be reduced.
26
  
 
Even more recent research, considers aspects that have decreased the importance of Investment Banks building 
relationships with their clients. One important aspect is the technology development during the last decades that 
has affected Investment Banks by facilitating information collection. The research shows that relationship 
building between Investment Banks and clients is today less important than half a decade ago, but still not 
insignificant. It also shows that clients through other sources of information, partly because of better information 
technology, have been able to easier pick banks that offer lower fees and satisfy their other criterions. Hence 
there can be a tradeoff between seeking to fulfill criterions for lowest price and building a relationship.
27
  
 
2.2.2 Relationship Banking  
Relationship banking is defined as the financial intermediary providing financial services on the basis on long-
term relationships with the client firm. The financial advisor and client firm can attain specific information and 
other benefits through multiple interactions with each other like earlier M&A, IPO (Initial Public Offering) or 
                                                          
23
 Xiang P., Zhou J., Zhou X., Ye K. (2012) 
24
 Karapetyan A., Stacescu B. (2008)  
25
 Hauswald R., Marquez R. (2000)  
26
 Forte G., Ianotta G., Navone M. (2008) 
27
 Morrison A., Wilhelm W. (2013) 
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other related transactions. Such relationship building can ease the monitoring and screening process which will 
reduce the asymmetrical information.
28
 Firstly, the cost of information production will be reduced with multiple 
transactions
29
. Secondly, financial advisors and clients can build trust and commitment through repeated 
transactions, often allowing for low-cost renegotiations of contracts
30
. Some other benefits from relationship 
banking in M&A is due to trust, related to the contract features: 1) Relationship banking might lead  the target 
firm to disclose more information than in a transaction-oriented relationship; 2) M&A contracts often include a 
retainer fee as collateral but with relationship building this fee can be negotiated
31
. 
 
A study regarding acquiring firms shows that switching costs are high to the extent that the acquiring firm is 
willing to pay a higher fee when it chooses to stay with its current advisor than to switch advisor. It further 
shows that this willingness for paying a higher fee is not only the consequence of the cost of switching advisor 
but also because of other benefits received from building a relationship with a financial advisor. A conclusion 
from this research is that the acquiring firm usually receives some other non-fee related benefits from having a 
long-term relationship with an advisor that makes them willing to pay a higher advisor fee.
32
  
 
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development  
2.3.1 Is it Profitable for Targets to Build a Relationship with Its Financial Advisor? 
In this paper we aim to measure the effect that relationships between targets and financial advisors have on the 
advisor fee and speed of transaction. With answering our first question we want to understand if firms can 
benefit or are worse off, from developing a relationship with a financial advisor in regard for M&A future 
transactions, in other words, is it better for firms to be loyal and have continuous cooperation with the same 
financial advisor or do they benefit in terms of paying a lower fee and/or get the deal closed quicker, if they 
switch banks? Hence we are trying to investigate the tradeoff between the impact of relationships setting the 
price and the market price. If firms are driven by a profit motive is it better to build a long relationship with a 
financial advisor or should they choose financial advisor on a deal-to-deal basis? For what type of deal is it 
beneficial? Also, what is the magnitude of these benefits? 
                                                          
28
 Boot AWA (2000) 
29
 Petersen MA, Rajan RG (1994) 
30
 Lehmann E., Neuberger D. (2001) 
31
 Boot AWA (2000) 
32
 Saunders A., Srinivasan A. (2001) 
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2.3.2 What Type of Deals Bring Benefits that Make Targets Stay Loyal? 
Secondly we want to understand the nature of the relationship between target-firm and financial advisor in terms 
of when the benefits arise most and what affects the relationship. We aim to investigate what type of deals are 
those that bring most benefits if the firm is building a relationship with a financial advisor, concerning future 
M&A deals with the firm as a target. We want to understand if it is firms that are performing larger or smaller 
transactions that are most loyal. Is the outcome of the last deal, more exactly if the deal was successful or not, 
affecting the loyalty of the target towards its financial advisor. What decides if the target-firm chooses to switch 
advisor?  
 
Our main questions that we aim to answer in our research are therefore:  
I. Are target-firms benefiting in terms of lower advisor fees or faster closed deal, from having a 
relationship with a financial advisor? Also, what type of deals will benefit firms most and to what 
extent? 
II. What decides if a target-firm chooses to build a relationship with a financial advisor? 
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3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Research Approach 
For our study, we use a quantitative method, cross sectional regressions to be able to study the patterns of 
relationships in the M&A industry. When using a quantitative method you evaluate theories and hypotheses as 
well as new evidence. Using this method enables us to focus on numerical and descriptive statistics as results of 
the study and also lets us generalize these results. Our aim is to investigate our hypotheses with variables that are 
both numerical and descriptive. From our results we strive to draw some generalized conclusions regarding 
benefits, relationships and loyalty between target-firm and financial advisor in the M&A industry.
33
  
 
Further, our research approach is inductive because our results are observations from earlier happenings that we 
then draw conclusions from and also, our hypothesis is derived from earlier research results
34
.  
 
 
3.2 Sample Description and Definition of Variables 
For collecting our data we used S&P Capital IQ which is our only source of data. S&P Capital IQ is a 
multinational database that provides real-time data for business research and analytics coverage, on over 60.000 
public companies and 2.2 million private companies. Its data contain financial information, M&A activity, and 
research reports.
35
 In our transaction screening we first narrow down the data to only include transactions with 
advisors located in the United States and Europe. Next we narrow down the data by announced date. Because we 
want to examine M&A transactions, this has to be included in the narrowing. Also, we want to include only 
transactions over the last couple of years but still collect enough data for our research, therefore we limit the 
screening to include M&A deals (all M&A features) that have been announced from January 1st 2010 to 
December 31st 2012. A reason for narrowing down the data sample by region is to reduce the amount of data in 
attempt for not collecting too much and not too little, but just enough data for our research. Our procedure, 
before performing the regressions and tests, include a great deal of manual processing of the data sample, thus 
we need a manageable data sample. This is also a reason for restricting our data to only include transactions over 
                                                          
33
 Moghaddam G., Moballeghi M.  
34
 Web Center for Social Research Methods 
35
 S&P Capital IQ 
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a three year period. A second reason for this narrowing is that we want to look at data that is up-to-date, 
especially since the industry has changed. Because we aimed to investigate the relationship between target and 
financial advisor we also narrowed down our screening to transactions where the target has had a financial 
advisor and the advisor fee is shown. This screening process gave us a sample of 686 observations which we 
included in our regressions.  
 
Our variables consist of both qualitative and quantitative data. For accuracy we choose to keep most of the 
quantitative data numerical. For estimating the effect of the quantitative data we transform those variables into 
dummy variables.  
 
To test our questions: 
I. Are target-firms benefiting in terms of lower advisor fees or faster closed deal, from having a 
relationship with a financial advisor? Also, what type of deals will benefit firms most and to what 
extent? 
II. What decides if a target-firm chooses to build a relationship with a financial advisor? 
 
We choose variables that we think can have an impact on our hypothesis, based on our theoretical research. 
These we divide into dependent and independent variables. The dependent variables are in some regressions 
tested as independent and are therefore labeled under both independent and dependent variables. 
 
Definition of Variables: 
Dependent Variables 
Advfee Fee paid by target to financial advisor measured as a percentage of total transaction value. 
This is one of the variables where we believe that there can be benefits to gain in terms of 
lower advisor fee due to relationship building. Because of the lowering monitoring and 
screening costs as a result of relationship building, we want to see if this also affects the 
advisor fee. 
 
Speed How fast the deal was implemented measured in days, from announced date to closed date.  
As stated, a fast M&A deal is something that firms normally desire. We therefore choose to 
examine also this variable as something that could benefit firms and want to see what affects 
the speed and then, when firms will receive this benefit in terms of a faster closed deal. 
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D_Switch If the target switched financial advisor for this deal or not. Measured as a dummy variable 
where 1 equals to a firm that has switched financial advisor since their last M&A deal.  
To answer our second question we use this variable to see what affects if a firm chooses to 
switch financial advisor or stay loyal and continue to build on a relationship. 
 
Independent Variables 
Advfee Fee paid by target to financial advisor measured as a percentage of total transaction value. 
This variable we use as an independent variable for examining the effect of advisor fee on 
speed. Assuming that financial advisors want to receive higher compensation; will they work 
faster if being paid a higher fee?  
 
 
Complexity Measured as number of different advisors to target involved in the transaction. 
Because this is a feature that can vary from deal to deal we are incorporating this variable in 
our research to measure if complexity is something that affects the advisor fee or speed of the 
deal. Will the number of advisors in an M&A deal affect these variables in a positive or 
negative way or not at all? 
 
Sought What amount of the target that is bought, measured in percentage of the firm.  
This is another feature of M&A deals that is varying. Our aim with incorporating this 
variable is to see if this variation is affecting the advisor fee or speed in any way. Are firms 
receiving benefits from being acquired fully? 
 
Speed How fast the deal was implemented measured in days, from announced date to closed date.  
As stated, firms want a quickly closed deal, hence our belief that speed of an M&A deal could 
be a factor that firms are willing to pay a higher advisor fee for. Because of this we 
incorporate speed as an independent variable for measuring the effect of speed on advisor 
fee. 
 
D_Earlcoop Earlier cooperation measured in number of earlier deals between target and the current 
financial advisor. We have taken into account earlier M&A deals, IPOs and similar 
transactions.  
Because we are examining the relationship between target and financial advisor and its 
effects on advisor fee, speed and if firms are staying loyal, this is a variable that we 
incorporate for answering both of our questions. We choose to look at earlier cooperation 
between the target and the financial advisor’s M&A section as well as similar sections. 
Referring to earlier statements, we consider these sections of financial advisory firms, such as 
Investment Banks, to be enough close for us to consider them important for the relationship 
between target and financial advisor. We look at earlier cooperation throughout the targets’ 
lifecycles to incorporate all of their earlier cooperation with particular financial advisors. 
 
D_Indfinancials If a firm is in the financial industry, measured as a dummy variable, where 1 means that the 
firm is in that industry.  
As we stated earlier, companies in the financial industry can be particularly hard to value, for 
this reason we want to see if this affects the advisor fee that the target-firm has to pay. We 
also check if the speed of completion is affected if the target-firm is operating in the financial 
industry.  
 
 
16 
 
D_Sizedeal Classifies the transactions into small or large, where a large transaction is > $1 000 000 000 
and a small transaction is < $1 000 000 000. The variable is measured as a dummy variable 
where 1 equals a transaction classified as large.  
As the deal size can differ greatly from different transactions we use this variable to see if the 
size of the transactions is something that affects the advisor fee and speed of completion. We 
choose to define a large deal as above $1 000mm as Financial Times has four categories for 
deal sizes in the following order in ($mm): 1) 0-500 2) 500-1 000 3) 1 000-5 000 4) 5 000+. 
When we transform the size into a dummy variable we use $1 000 mm as a large 
transaction.36 
 
D_EarlOutcome If the target’s latest M&A deal was successful or not. Measured as a dummy variable where 1 
equals a successful earlier outcome.  
We would like to see if the outcome of the target´s last M&A deal will affect the decision if the 
firm chooses to switch financial advisor for the next M&A deal. We also check if the earlier 
outcome affects the next advisor fee and speed of the transaction.  
 
D_Switch If the target switched financial advisor for this deal or not. Measured as a dummy variable 
where 1 equals a firm that has switched.  
Based on our theoretical presentation, switching advisor can cause costs for the target-firm. 
We therefore incorporate this variable to examine the effect on advisor fee and speed. This 
helps us measure the effect on these variables for when firms have switched financial advisor 
since their last M&A deal. Hence we can measure if staying loyal and building a relationship 
brings benefits in terms of lower advisor fee and faster closed deal.  
 
D_Topbank Classifies the financial advisors into two categories - top banks and other financial advisors. 
The top banks are: Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Barclays, Citi, Deutsche 
Bank, Credit Suisse, Bank of America Merill Lynch, Rothchild, UBS. (Källa FT) Measured as 
a dummy variable where 1 equals a top bank.  
Due to the higher success rate of M&A deals performed by top banks we assume that target-
firms desire having these as financial advisors. We therefore include this variable to see both 
if firms have to pay a higher advisor fee and get a faster closed deal from hiring a top bank, 
and also if they are staying loyal more often to top banks. We have used the classification of 
top banks as stated by the Financial Times37.  
 
D_Hostile Categorizes if a deal is hostile or friendly in nature, we measure this as a dummy variable 
where 1 equals hostile deal attitude.    
We include this variable as hostile deals are more complex because of a negative attitude 
from the target-firms management. This negative attitude can be expressed by an 
unwillingness to cooperate from the target-firm’s side, causing severe problems with 
asymmetrical information. 
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3.3 Estimation Techniques 
To analyze the selected benefits that may arise from relationship building between target and financial advisor in 
an M&A deal, and to analyze what additional factors determine if a firm proceeds with relationship building, we 
use a data sample of descriptive variables, both qualitative and quantitative. Further, before examining our data 
we transform the qualitative variables into dummy variables.  
 
To answer our first question regarding benefits received in terms of lower advisor fee for target-firm to pay and a 
faster closed deal, we run two least square regressions. In the first one we let advisor fee be the dependent 
variable and run the other variables as independent to measure which of these have a significant effect on advisor 
fee and hence what will lead to the benefit of a lower fee to pay for financial advising. In the second least square 
regression we let speed be the dependent variable and run all the others as independent, to measure which 
variables affect the speed of an M&A deal. 
 
The least square regression we run for measuring what variables affect financial advisor fee: 
 
Advfeei = β1 + β2Complexity + β3Speed + β4D_Earlcoop + β5D_Hostile + β6D_Sizedeal + 
β7Sought + β8D_Indfinancials + β9D_Earloutcome + β10D_Switch + β11D_Topbank + εi 
 
The least square regression we run for measuring what variables affect speed: 
 
Speedi = β1 + β2Complexity + β3Advfee + β4D_Earlcoop + β5D_Hostile + β6D_Sizedeal + 
β7Sought + β8D_Indfinancials + β9D_Earloutcome + β10D_Switch + β11D_Topbank + εi 
 
 
Further to answer our second question, regarding what determines if a firm chooses to be loyal or to switch 
financial advisor, we run a probit regression where we let the dummy variable for switching be the dependent 
variable. We choose only to include the variables: size of deal, earlier outcome, classification of the financial 
advisor, earlier cooperation and deal attitude as independent variables, because due to earlier research, 
incorporated in our theoretical framework and our motivations under sample description, we find these to be 
possibly significant. Lastly, we run Chi-square tests for the variables that are showing to be significant in our 
probit regression, to strengthen our results. Only for the variable D_Hostile we choose to perform a Fisher’s 
18 
 
exact test due to the low frequency of hostile transactions in our data sample. For this variable, hostile 
transactions only account for 0,87% of our total observations, therefore Chi-square with small counts may come 
up with inaccurate results because of the estimation that the test performs. A requirement for performing a Chi-
square test is that the expected frequency of most categories should be at least 5 and no expected frequency 
should be less than 1. When the sample size is small and requirements for performing a Chi-square test are not 
fulfilled, Fisher’s exact test is a better choice.38  
 
Because the dependent variable is a dummy variable we cannot use a least square regression to estimate our 
model. For estimating these types of models that are classified as Binary Choice Models, the most common 
approaches are logit analysis and probit analysis. They both provide very similar estimates; where probit tend to 
give slightly higher or lower estimates than logit. Using one of these methods we can, through a couple of steps, 
get the marginal effect on the probability of firms switching financial advisor.
39
 
 
The probit regression we run for measuring what variables affect if firms switch advisor: 
 
D_Switchi = β1 + β2D_Hostile + β3D_Sizedeal + β4D_Topbank + β5D_Earlcoop + 
β6D_Earloutcome + εi 
 
Where the probability for switching is: 
 
Pi =   
 
 
D_Switchi = 
 
 
By estimating our model with a probit regression we can test which of the variables that are having a significant 
effect on the target-firm’s choice of switching financial advisor or staying loyal, with the p-value that is shown in 
                                                          
38
 Körner S., Wahlgren L. (2006: 252-257) 
39
 Dougherty C. (2011: 365-366) 
1 with probability Pi 
0 with probability 1 - Pi 
 
(1) 
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the regression output. To measure the more precise effect that the variables have on this decision, we need to 
find the probability for switching and multiply it with each coefficient from the regression, as shown below.
40
   
 
Marginal effects = f(Z)*βi  *βi    
 
To find the probability Pi = f(Z) we need to calculate Z for the mean values of the explanatory variables, which 
we do by summarizing the mean values for each independent variable in the probit regression. Then we 
incorporate this Z value as shown in the probit regression table, into formula (1) to receive the probability 
function. Lastly, we multiply our coefficient values of the independent variables with this expression as in 
formula (2). We do these last steps manually, from the summarizing of mean values to calculating the marginal 
effects. By doing so, we can interpret these values as the marginal effect of each independent value on the 
probability of a firm switching advisor.
41
  
 
 
3.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Study 
Through our study we choose to include a number of variables that we find interesting in the evaluation of our 
hypothesis, based on our motivation in section 3.2. We recognize that there might be a number of significant 
variables that are not captured by our data sample. There are certain variables that we are not able to collect in 
S&P Capital IQ, such as how large share of the advisor fee that was contingent to the deal. Through a survey, 
more soft variables could be collected, such as the satisfaction of the transaction and the targets own opinion of 
the relationship with their earlier financial advisors. A target might have earlier cooperation with several 
financial advisors but other circumstances might make one of the relationships stronger and affect their choice of 
staying with that particular financial advisor. We cannot include soft variables like these because we have not 
performed such a survey. 
 
We only look at prior IPO, M&A and similar transactions because we find these to be closely related. Although a 
relationship between target and financial advisor could perhaps be affected by the firm’s relationships with other 
parts of the financial advisor’s business divisions. One example could be if the target-firm has had prior lending 
cooperation with a financial advisor that also provides M&A actives like the global banks. 
                                                          
40
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A strength is that our data sample consist of 686 observations which is a quite large number. A weakness with 
our data sample is that some of the variables contain a rather large amount of missing values, as in the case 
where we measure loyalty where 22% of the observations are undisclosed. 
 
One strength of our study is the fact that we are looking at earlier cooperation that extends over the firms’ 
lifecycles. This gives us all prior relationships between firms and financial advisors. Some firms do not perform 
M&A activities often and it is therefore important for us to look at all historical data.  
 
Another strength of our study is that we have significant results, enabling us to make a discussion and draw 
conclusions. This may indicate that our questions are well framed for our sample data. Our results are also 
supporting several earlier research results that are brought up in this paper.  
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4. Research results 
4.1 Results Regarding Question One 
Are target-firms benefiting in terms of lower advisor fees or faster closed deal, from having a relationship with a 
financial advisor? Also, what type of deals will benefit firms most and to what extent? 
 
One variable that we need to include to be able to answer our question regarding benefits acquired from a 
relationship between the target and financial advisor is the loyalty factor. What amount of the firms choose to 
stay with their earlier financial advisor and hence build a form of relationship, and how many choose to switch 
financial advisor? Our sample shows that around 51% of the firms switched financial advisor since their last 
M&A deal, which implies that around half of the firms found it more beneficial to not continue a relationship. 
Further, about 47% have had earlier cooperation with its latest financial advisor in form of a target-firm choosing 
to return to an earlier advisor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regarding the speed of a transaction, we find that the average amount of days needed to complete an M&A deal 
from announced date to closed date, is 121 days. The fastest M&A deals required around a month’s time to 
close, while the longest deal in our sample took 637 days or two years, from the announced date to closed date.  
 
 
51% 
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20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
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Amount of firms that stayed loyal to their last M&A
financial advisor or switched
Figure 1. Loyalty in terms of keeping the financial 
advisor from the last M&A deal 
47% 
53% 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Earlier cooperation No earlier
cooperation
If the target-firms have had any M&A or similar
transactions before, with the financial advisor for
the last M&A deal
Figure 2. Earlier cooperation between target-firm 
and financial advisor 
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As mentioned before, one of our variables included in our research is complexity of the M&A deal in terms of 
number of advisors to target that are involved. The table below shows that the majority of the firms still choose 
more than one advisor and most often have between two and five advisors involved in the M&A transaction. 
Only 1,16% of the firms choose to involve only one advisor in the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39,65% 
50,87% 
2,04% 
7,44% 
0,00%
10,00%
20,00%
30,00%
40,00%
50,00%
60,00%
70,00%
80,00%
90,00%
100,00%
Under 3 months Between 3 months
and 1 year
Over 1 year Not closed/Cancelled
Speed, measured in days from announced date to closed date
Figure 3. Speed of transaction 
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Figure 4. Complexity in terms of number of advisors involved in M&A deals 
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The amount sought in a target is something that we also thought could be an influencing factor for the advisor 
fee paid by the target. Our sample shows that a majority of the firms, around 86%, are fully bought by its buyer. 
We also found that the average deal value for our sample is $1 629 970 000 which we classify as a large 
transaction value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From our data we can also see that, almost 20% of the target-firms in our data sample belong in the finance 
industry. The rest of the target-firms in our sample are divided across several different industries.  
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Figure 5. Amount sought in target-firm 
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Figure 6. Financial advisor fee 
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From our regressions, as shown in Table 1 on the page 25, we see that speed in fact has a highly significant 
effect on the advisor fee, more exactly speed is statistically significant on a 1% level. The longer it takes to close 
the deal, the lower advisor fee the target has to pay to its financial advisor. In percentage this effect means that 
for every day longer that the deal takes, the advisor fee decreases with 0,002% of the total transaction value. This 
is not a big impact considering that financial advisor fees are on average 1,55% of the total transaction value. 
Complexity on the other hand does not have a statistically significant effect on the advisor fee as we originally 
thought. The total number of advisors does affect the amount paid to each financial advisor though not 
significantly. Further we see that if the deal is large (> $1 000 000 000) it will generate a lower price in relation 
to the total transaction value; this is statistically significant on a 1% level. This means that for a small transaction 
firms pay a higher percentage in advisor fee to its financial advisor, than for a large transaction. If the transaction 
is classified as large the target-firm will pay approximately 0,816% less of the total transaction cost in financial 
advisor fee, which is a much stronger result compared to that from speed. Also the industry that the target firm is 
located in has an important role in determining the advisor fee. If the target is in the financial industry it will 
affect the financial advisor’s compensation to grow with 0,494%, which is statistically significant on a 1% level.  
 
As stated, complexity does not affect the advisor fee to the financial advisor in a significant way, though it does 
have a highly statistical significant effect on the speed of the transaction. Statistically, complexity is significant 
on a 1% level. For each additional advisor that the target involves, the transaction will take almost 15 days 
longer to close. Our regression further shows that for a higher price the financial advisor works faster to close the 
deal. More specifically, advisor fee is significant on a 1% level and the marginal effect of one unit higher advisor 
fee is a decrease in almost seven days.  
 
The belongingness of the target-firm in the financial industry, showed to be highly significant for both the speed 
of transactions and the advisor fee paid by target. On a significance level of 1%, the marginal effect of being in 
this industry as a target-firm, increases the advisor fee with almost 0,5% of the total transaction value. Also on a 
significance level of 1%, being in the financial industry as target lengthens the transaction with 49 days. 
 
If the M&A deal is of hostile nature, this will increase the process with 35 days but is only statistically 
significant on a 10% level. We can also see a significant effect on a 1% level on speed by the target’s industry. If 
the target is in the financial industry the deal will take 49 days longer to proceed. Further, the regression result 
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shows that if the target’s buyer acquires a larger percentage of the firm, this will impact negatively on the days 
for transaction completion. On a significance level of 1%, the deal will take around one day less to close for 
every additional percentage of the target-firm that is acquired.  
 
The values in Table 1, that are not in brackets are the coefficients, and should be interpret as marginal effects. 
The values in brackets are the standard errors for the coefficients above them. We show the significance level for 
each coefficient by marking with asterisks, as explained in the table.   
 
Our Wald tests, as show on the next page, done on the regressions above, confirm that some of the independent 
variables involved are significant for our dependent variables advisor fee and speed. To confirm the 
insignificance of the independent variables that we cannot state are significant from our regression results, we 
also perform Wald tests testing if these variables are all equal to zero. As the test results show, these variables 
have no effect on the dependent variables advisor fee and speed.  
 Table 1. Least square regressions, advisor fee and speed  
 Advfee 
 
Speed 
 
Complexity  
-0,016 
[0,042] 
 14,803*** 
[2,390] 
 
Speed  
-0,002*** 
[0,001] 
 
- 
 
Advfee - 
 -6,547*** 
[2,012] 
 
D_Earlcoop 
-0,147 
[0,160] 
 3,550 
[9,407] 
 
D_Hostile 
0,774 
[0,892] 
 35,412* 
[18,629] 
 
D_Sizedeal 
-0,816*** 
[0,143] 
 14,637 
[9,029] 
 
Sought 
0,000 
[0,003] 
 -1,146*** 
[0,369] 
 
D_Indfinancials 
0,494*** 
[0,181] 
 49,173*** 
[9,387] 
 
D_Earloutcome 
-0,018 
[0,342] 
 39,406*** 
[7,940] 
 
D_Switch 
-0216 
[0,175] 
 3,528 
[11,147] 
 
D_Topbank 
-0,034 
[0,138] 
 -2,489 
[7,522] 
 
_cons 
1,929*** 
[0,535] 
 121,278**
* 
[41,394] 
 
N 478 
 
478 
 
 
* p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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Table 3. Wald tests, advisor fee and speed 
 Advfee Speed 
 Value df Probability Value df Probability 
F-statistic 0,319342 (7, 467) 0,9452 0,895655 (4, 467) 0,4881 
Chi-square 2,235391 7 0,9457 3,438622 4 0,4873 
Null hypothesis: insignificant variables from the least square regressions are all equal to zero.   
       
 
 
4.2 Results Regarding Question Two 
What decides if a target- firm chooses to build a relationship with a financial advisor? 
 
Answering our second question, one thing we want to investigate is if the deal attitude has an impact on the 
firm’s choice to switch advisor. In our sample only about 1% of the firms have a hostile approach from the 
buyer. The rest of the deals are classified as friendly. Further, our sample shows that the majority of the deals are 
smaller than $1 000 000 000, while around 30% of the deals are worth $1 000 000 000 or worth even more.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Wald tests, advisor fee and speed 
 Advfee Speed 
 Value df Probability Value df Probability 
F-statistic 7,308421 (10, 467) 0,0000 12,26075 (10, 467) 0,0000 
Chi-square 73,08421 10 0,0000 122,6075 10 0,0000 
Null hypothesis: all independent variables are equal to zero  
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Figure 8. Size of the M&A transaction 
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As stated earlier, we choose to classify the financial advisors associated as a top bank or as other financial 
advisors. We find that, as much as 36,73% of all deals, involved one of the top banks as a financial advisor. 
Another factor we think could be important for firms being loyal or not, is the outcome of their earlier M&A 
deal. Our data shows that a large majority of the firms’ earlier deals had been successful and only 2,48% of the 
firms had had unsuccessful status of their earlier M&A deal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our regression shows that on a statistically significance level of 10%, if the deal had a hostile attitude, the firms 
were more inclined to switch financial advisor. More exactly, if an M&A deal has a hostile approach, this will 
increase the probability for the target to switch financial advisor with 1,84%. It also tells us that the size of the 
deal has on a statistically significant level of 1% a negative effect on the firm’s decision to keep their last 
financial advisor or to switch to another one. If the total transaction amount is equal to or larger than $1 000 000 
000, then this will decrease the probability of target switching advisor with 1,14% which is in fact a smaller 
impact than that from deal attitude. Also, if a target-firm’s last financial advisor was one of the top banks, this 
will on a statistically significant level of 1% affect the switching decision negatively. This means that if a firm 
had one of the top banks as financial advisor for their last M&A deal, they will often stay with that advisor for 
their next M&A deal as well. The marginal effect on the probability for switching is a decrease of 1,11%.  
 
One factor that we thought should have a significant effect on the firm’s choice of switching or not switching 
advisor was the outcome of the firm’s earlier M&A deal. This showed not to be significant. On the other hand, if 
36,73% 
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other financial advisors
Figure 9. Classification of financial advisors 
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Figure 10. Outcome from the earlier M&A deal 
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the firm has had similar cooperation sometimes before with a financial advisor, this will significantly affect their 
choice of staying loyal to that advisor. On a statistically significance level of 1%, earlier cooperation will affect 
the probability of switching financial advisor with a decrease of 4,81%.  
 
 
 
Our Chi-square test results as seen in the appendix support the significant effect that both the fact if the financial 
advisor is a top bank or not; size of the deal and; if there has been an earlier cooperation between target and 
financial advisor, have on the choice if the target will switch financial advisor or stay loyal. Due to the low 
frequency in our data of M&A deals with a hostile deal attitude, this variable does not fulfill the requirement for 
performing a Chi-square test, as explained in section 3.2, instead we use Fisher´s exact test to test this variable 
against the frequency of switching. What this test tells us is that we should not interpret the variable for deal 
attitude as a having a statistically significant effect on target’s decision for switching advisor. 42 
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 Appendix 
Table 4. Probit regression, switched financial advisor 
 D_Switch  f(Z)  
Marginal 
Effects 
 
D_Hostile 
0,913* 
[0,551] 
 0,0201  0,0184  
D_Sizedeal 
-0,567*** 
[0,177] 
 0,0201  -0,0114  
D_Topbank 
-0,550*** 
[0,175] 
 0,0201  -0,0111  
D_Earlcoop 
-2,395*** 
[0,201] 
 0,0201  -0,0481  
D_Earloutcome 
-0,875 
[0,569] 
 0,0201  -0,0176  
_cons 
3,281*** 
[0,607] 
 -    
N 507  507  507  
* p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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5. Discussion 
5.1 Discussion of Question One 
Are target-firms benefiting in terms of lower advisor fees or faster closed deal, from having a relationship with a 
financial advisor? Also, what type of deals will benefit firms most and to what extent? 
 
In support to the more recent research we mentioned in our theoretical framework, relationship building seems to 
not bring a relationship discount anymore. According to our results this is also true for the relationship between 
target and financial advisor. Instead, more transaction related variables such as speed, size of deal and industry 
have today a significant effect on the advisor fee. Targets will benefit in terms of lower advisor fee, if they do 
not rush the transaction process. This could be due to the fact that it is the same amount of information that the 
financial advisor needs to collect. Therefore the advisor will naturally demand a higher price for performing this 
service more quickly. In the same way is the size of deal affecting advisor fee. We see that a larger transaction 
will not bring with it a higher financial advisor fee for target, instead it is the opposite. We believe that this is a 
consequence of the fact that the financial advisor has to perform about the same service for a smaller transaction 
as a larger.  
 
Further, the results from our least square regressions strengthen our hypothesis that if the target-firm is in the 
financial industry, it will affect both advisor fee and speed of transaction. This may indicate that if the target-
firm belongs in an industry that complicates valuation, it will increase the financial advisor fee and prolong the 
time for closing the deal.  
 
Our research shows that also the speed of M&A transactions is not being significantly affected by earlier 
cooperation between target and financial advisor, also in this case it is more transaction related variables and 
deal features that are affecting our variable speed. Increasing the number of advisors involved and hence 
complexity showed to be an increasing factor for the number of days required completing the transaction. This 
can be interpret as a higher claim for communication between the advisors and target and advisors mutually, 
which could be a factor for increasing asymmetrical information. Also a reason for this could be that the 
complexity of the specific deal is larger when the firm includes more advisors. A hostile approach will increase 
the number of days to complete the transaction. As expected, this indicates that it usually takes longer to 
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complete a hostile takeover than a non-hostile one due to the added complexity with hostile takeovers. One 
reason for the added complexity is the increased asymmetrical information which makes it harder for the 
financial advisors to collect information.    
 
As discussed above there are variables affecting advisor fee although earlier cooperation is not one of them. In 
section 2.2.2 we presented results from a study by Saunders and Srinivasan, showing that acquiring firms do not 
gain any advisor fee discount due to earlier cooperation. The study shows instead that firms are willing to pay a 
higher advisor fee for other gained benefits in the transaction.
43
 In our study we can see that this seems to be true 
also for the target-firm. Our results do not support an advisor fee discount due to earlier cooperation between 
target-firm and financial advisor, although firms seem to be willing to pay a higher financial advisor fee to gain 
the benefit in terms of a faster closed deal. 
 
 
5.2 Discussion of Question Two 
What decides if a target-firm chooses to build a relationship with a financial advisor? 
 
As we show, firms do not receive benefits in terms of lower advisor fee or a quicker closed deal when staying 
loyal to the financial advisor. Despite this, at least a third of all targets choose to rehire their last financial 
advisor, as our research shows. As stated earlier, firms do not tend to keep their advisors out of laziness since it 
is an important part of financial planning for many firms. So what makes firms still being loyal? 
 
Our results indicate that deals that are of large transaction value will affect the firms willingness to stay loyal 
positively, meaning that the probability for switching advisor is decreased when the transaction size is larger 
than $1 000 000 000. This may further indicate that firms trust their last advisor, and when a large transaction 
amount is involved, they tend to stay with that advisor that they are trusting. We draw a similar conclusion from 
the result regarding firms’ intention to stay loyal if the financial advisor is one of the top banks. As earlier 
research has shown, firms usually trust top banks to bring a satisfying result and have an advantage compared to 
other financial advisors.  
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The deal attitude has a vague significance on the decision of switching advisor, although it still has an important 
effect as presented in our results. The fact that the probability for switching advisor increases, when the deal 
attitude is hostile may indicate that firms do not want to destroy the relationship with their previous financial 
advisor, due to the uncooperative nature of a hostile deal. This could indicate that target-firms want to nurture 
their relationships with their financial advisor previous to the hostile deal, for future cooperation after the hostile 
M&A deal.  
 
If a firm has had earlier cooperation with a financial advisor, it strengthens the chance to return to that advisor 
for future transactions. Our results show that relationships are not as important in the M&A industry as they have 
been, referring to earlier studies. What this might indicate is that new relationships are harder to start today due 
to their decrease in importance, but firms that already have an ongoing relationship with their financial advisor 
will tend to stay with that advisor. Therefore, there must be some benefits gained by the target firm for staying 
loyal. 
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6. Conclusions 
As shown relationship banking does not affect price and speed significantly anymore. But there still exists a 
problem with asymmetrical information. This could be due to the decrease in relationship banking. We therefore 
conclude that there is a tradeoff between maximizing benefits in terms of lower price and faster deal, and 
asymmetrical information.  
 
Transaction-oriented variables are today having a larger and more significant impact on advisor fee and speed of 
the deal. This also implies that relationship banking in the M&A industry has decreased in importance. We 
conclude that as a target-firm, being loyal to a financial advisor will not make any impact on neither the advisor 
fee nor the speed of completion of the M&A deal.  
 
Firms tend to stay loyal to their financial advisors as a kind of security due to trust, or in hope for satisfying 
result. These are other benefits that are brought by relationship banking that are perhaps less measurable than 
advisor fee and speed of transaction. Hence there are some benefits left to gain for target in building a 
relationship with its financial advisor.  
 
Firms tend to switch advisor if the M&A deal has a hostile attitude. We draw the conclusion that this is because 
they see some benefits with relationship with their current advisor that they do not want to destroy, due to 
hostile-deal circumstances.  
 
If there already is an existing relationship between target-firm and financial advisor, firms then tend to stay loyal 
to that advisor. From this, we conclude that relationships can bring benefits for target-firm. Although these are 
other benefits than lower advisor fee and a faster closed deal, as are explored by us. 
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7. Suggestion for Future Research 
Although relationship banking is a widely studied area, there still remain questions to answer regarding the 
relationship between target-firms and financial advisors and also other relationships in the M&A industry.  
 
A suggestion is to examine the questions we aim to answer in this paper but include different variables that can 
be attained through a qualitative research method. This would enable the researcher to dig deeper in the nature of 
the relationship between target-firm and financial advisor. By collecting survey data regarding variables such as 
satisfaction of a transaction; targets own opinion about earlier cooperation; and the targets own valuations of 
benefits that can be gained through relationship building, the researcher will perhaps be able to receive more 
results regarding the questions when firms feel that they gain benefits with a financial advisor and what decides 
when they choose to stay loyal to the advisor.  
 
As commonly known, technology development has simplified networking and also enhanced its importance 
industry-wide. It can be interesting to investigate the impact that networks have on the target-advisor relationship 
and on the target-firm’s decision to stay loyal or switch advisor. This could also bring answers regarding the 
importance of networking in M&A industry. This question could be broadened to cover more parts of the 
banking industry.   
 
Another angle for approaching the questions we designed for this paper is to investigate them but from the 
financial advisor’s point of view. Instead of questioning if the target-firm benefits from relationship building in 
the M&A industry, this question can instead be expressed in terms of what benefits the financial advisor could 
gain. Also, instead of asking what decides when a target-firm chooses to build a relationship with its financial 
advisor, the question could be reversed into asking when a financial advisor chooses to build a relationship with 
a client.  
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8. Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi-square test 1. Frequency of Top Banks and Switching 
Financial Advisor 
 
          Pearson chi2(2) =  96.3341   Pr = 0.000
                100.00     100.00      100.00 
                 63.36      36.64      100.00 
     Total         434        251         685 
                                             
                 57.83      39.04       50.95 
                 71.92      28.08      100.00 
         1         251         98         349 
                                             
                 14.52      48.61       27.01 
                 34.05      65.95      100.00 
         0          63        122         185 
                                             
                 27.65      12.35       22.04 
                 79.47      20.53      100.00 
         .         120         31         151 
                                             
  D_Switch           0          1       Total
                   D_TopBank
                     
  column percentage  
   row percentage    
      frequency      
                     
  Key                
                     
. tabulate D_Switch D_TopBank, chi2 column row
Chi-square test 2. Frequency of Large transactions and 
Switching Financial Advisor 
 
          Pearson chi2(2) = 100.5506   Pr = 0.000
                100.00     100.00      100.00 
                 68.84      31.16      100.00 
     Total         444        201         645 
                                             
                 56.08      39.80       51.01 
                 75.68      24.32      100.00 
         1         249         80         329 
                                             
                 16.22      52.74       27.60 
                 40.45      59.55      100.00 
         0          72        106         178 
                                             
                 27.70       7.46       21.40 
                 89.13      10.87      100.00 
         .         123         15         138 
                                             
  D_Switch           0          1       Total
                  D_SizeDeal
                     
  column percentage  
   row percentage    
      frequency      
                     
  Key                
                     
. tabulate D_Switch D_SizeDeal, chi2 column row
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Chi-square test 3. Frequency of Earlier Cooperation and 
Switching Financial Advisor 
 
          Pearson chi2(2) = 257.8547   Pr = 0.000
                100.00     100.00      100.00 
                 52.93      47.07      100.00 
     Total         361        321         682 
                                             
                 73.68      25.86       51.17 
                 76.22      23.78      100.00 
         1         266         83         349 
                                             
                  1.94      55.45       27.13 
                  3.78      96.22      100.00 
         0           7        178         185 
                                             
                 24.38      18.69       21.70 
                 59.46      40.54      100.00 
         .          88         60         148 
                                             
  D_Switch           0          1       Total
                  D_EarlCoop
                     
  column percentage  
   row percentage    
      frequency      
                     
  Key                
                     
. tabulate D_Switch D_EarlCoop, chi2 column row
Fisher’s Exact test 1. Frequency of Hostile Deal Attitude and 
Switching Financial Advisor 
 
           Fisher's exact =                 0.562
                100.00     100.00      100.00 
                 99.12       0.88      100.00 
     Total         679          6         685 
                                             
                 50.81      66.67       50.95 
                 98.85       1.15      100.00 
         1         345          4         349 
                                             
                 26.95      33.33       27.01 
                 98.92       1.08      100.00 
         0         183          2         185 
                                             
                 22.24       0.00       22.04 
                100.00       0.00      100.00 
         .         151          0         151 
                                             
  D_Switch           0          1       Total
                   D_Hostile
stage 1:  enumerations = 0
stage 2:  enumerations = 2
stage 3:  enumerations = 1
Enumerating sample-space combinations:
                     
  column percentage  
   row percentage    
      frequency      
                     
  Key                
                     
. tabulate D_Switch D_Hostile, column exact row
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